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Abstract
During the 1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts to fight high and
persistent levels of unemployment.  Although these contracts have been widely used,
unemployment has remained about the same after fifteen years.  This paper builds a theoretical
model to reconcile these facts.  We analyse the labour market effect of the introduction of fixed-
term contracts and the firm’s choice of contracts are studied.  Permanent contracts are the
standard way to offer incentives, but fixed-term contracts are cheaper.  This generates an
externality, which can make employment higher in the system with only permanent contracts.
As a consequence, from a social point of view, the share of fixed-term contracts is too large.
Increases in the renewal rate of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts lead to higher
employment levels.  Finally, the model highlights the interactions between different rigidities in
the labour market.  Aggregate employment and the share of temporary contracts are affected in
the same way by the firing costs and the flexibility of wages.
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1 Introduction
Most European countries are considered economies with highly regulated
labor markets, particularly when compared to the US. At the same time, it
is also a well known fact that, since the mid-1970s, Europe has had much
higher unemployment levels than the US. It has often been suggested that
the di¤erent degrees of ‡exibility of their labor markets could be responsible
for the di¤erences in their labor market performances. Despite the ongoing
debate on the possible causes of European unemployment and, in particular,
on the possible e¤ect of labor market ‡exibility,1 many European countries
have already started to implement reforms in their labor markets: more
‡exible regulations have been introduced to …ght high and persistent levels
of unemployment.
Typically, European labor markets have been characterized by a wide
use of permanent contracts with, what appear to be, high …ring costs. A
common way to increase ‡exibility has been to allow employers the option
of hiring workers using …xed-term contracts with negligible …ring costs. For
most countries, these …xed-term contracts cannot be used continuously and
forever. They require a conversion into permanent contracts after a speci…c
amount of time. In addition, for most countries, the job for which the worker
is hired with a …xed-term contract is not required to be a seasonal one.2
Since their introduction, …xed-term contracts have been widely used.
These account for most new jobs.3 More surprisingly, they have been used for
all types of jobs and occupations.4 However, unemployment has remained as
high as before the reforms. At the same time, this type of reform has created
a two-tier system and the labor market has become highly segmented.5 This
1For instance, see Bean (1994) and Layard et al. (1991) for a survey on unemployment
and Jackman et al. (1996), Nickell and Layard (1998) and Piore (1986) for the debate on
labor market ‡exibility.
2See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1993, 1994 and 1999) for a detailed descrip-
tion of …xed-term contracts regulations in Europe.
3For instance, in Spain 98% of newly registered contracts between 1986 and 1992 were
…xed-term contracts (see Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992). In France, in 1992, 80% of all
entries were hirings on …xed-term contracts (see Goux et al., 2000).
4See OECD (1993).
5The share of …xed-term contracts in Spain has gone from 11% to 35% between 1983
and 1995. In France, it has gone from 3.3% to 12% during this period. See OECD (1993).
1is mainly due to the low transition of …xed-term contracts into permanent
ones.6
This paper builds a theoretical model to reconcile these facts: unchanged
unemployment levels despite the wide use of more ‡exible labor contracts.
The introduction of …xed-term contracts is analyzed in the framework of
an e¢ciency wage model. As will be discussed, this kind of model is best
suited to examine the two main di¤erences between …xed-term and perma-
nent contracts, namely, …ring costs and contract duration. High wages are
the standard way to provide incentives with permanent contracts, but …xed-
term contracts are cheaper. The …rm’s choice of hiring with one contract or
the other is analyzed. Firing will be given exogenously. So, in the terminol-
ogy of labor demand models, …rms will be operating in the hiring regime.
Fixed-termincentive-compatible contracts are thencharacterized. I will show
that the instrument that allows the provision of incentives with …xed-term
contracts is not their wage, but the renewal rate of these contracts into per-
manent ones. Fixed-term contracts are chosen by …rms when they are cheap
enough. But this implies an externality which can make aggregate employ-
ment higher in a system with only permanent contracts. Firms do not take
into account, in the two-tier system, that the increase in out‡ows from un-
employment result in higher wages for permanent contracts. In this case, the
optimal renewal rate of …xed-term contracts from the social point of view is
one. That is, employment can be increased by reducing the in‡ows back to
unemployment.
There is a growing literature on the impact of …xed-term contracts on
several aspects of the labor market.7 In relation to the e¤ects on aggregate
employment, the literature has beendominated by partial equilibriummodels
of labor demand.8 These models have the same characteristics as those of
labor demand with …ring costs.9 These are very useful to understand the
e¤ects of these …ring restrictions on the dynamic functioning of the labor
market. But the e¤ects on aggregate employment are ambiguous and remain
in partial equilibrium.
Here, I choose an e¢ciency wage model to study the impact of …xed-
6In Spain, between 1987 and 1996, only 11% of …xed-term contracts are converted into
permanent ones (see Güell and Petrongolo, 2000).
7See, for example, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (1999), Alba (1994, 1996 and
1998), Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Goux et al. (2000), Jimeno and Toharia (1993 and
1996) and Saint-Paul (1996).
8Exceptions of this are Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) and Alonso-Borrego et al.
(1999).
9See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994),
Bertola (1992) and Nickell (1978).
2term contracts on employment through their e¤ect on wages.10 This type
of model not only allows for e¤ects of …ring costs on wages but it is also
possible to consider a broad view of employment protection legislation and
not just severance payments. In particular, dismissal con‡icts which have
been blamed for being costly can be modeled in a simple way.
One additional characteristic of …xed-term contracts is that they di¤er
in duration with respect to permanent contracts. The existing literature
has not explicitly taken this into account. In a competitive labor market,
the duration of contracts does not matter. In an e¢ciency wage model,
duration of contracts is an important source of incentives. Studying …xed-
term contracts in an e¢ciency wage model allows to explicitly address the
question of how incentives may be provided inshort duration contracts. This,
in turn, would answer the previously mentioned striking fact that …xed-term
contracts are used even for jobs where duration matters. So, in the model,
the share of …xed-term contracts is endogenous.
This paper highlights the links between di¤erent rigidities in the labor
market. Employment and the share of …xed-term contracts are a¤ected in
the same way by the …ring costs associated with permanent contracts and
the ‡exibility of wages in …xed-term contracts. The mechanism by which
the creation of employment and, more precisely, permanent employment are
discouraged is the combination of these last two. The introduction of …xed-
term contracts does not completely remove the e¤ect of …ring costs unless
the wages in …xed-term contracts are perfectly ‡exible. For this reason, two
extreme situations could generate higher employment than a two-tier system
with unchanged …ring costs and less than perfectly ‡exible wages in …xed-
term contracts. One would be a situation in which the wages of …xed-term
contracts are very high. In this system, permanent contracts alone would
generate higher employment than the two-tier system. The other situation
would be the case with perfectly ‡exible wages in …xed-term contracts. In
this case, full employment would arise.11
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is introduced.
First, I consider an economy where only permanent contracts are available
and …ring costs reduce employment (section 2.1). Then, the introduction of
contracts with no …ring costs (…xed-term contracts) in such economy is ana-
10In Saint-Paul (1996), chapter 7, this is also studied although it is assumed that …xed-
term workers are already di¤erent ex-ante from permanent workers and are paid at the
competitive wage. This “dual labor market” approach does not allow to analyze why in
Europe most of the out‡ows from unemployment are …xed-term contracts nor the renewals
of …xed-term contracts into permanent contracts.
11As it will be shown, full employment is possible in a two-tier system despite the
presence of the incentive problem.
3lyzed (section 2.2). The optimal incentive-compatible contract is described,
the …rm’s choice of contracts is analyzed, and then the market outcome is
derived and compared to the situation where only permanent contracts are
available (section 2.3). Section 2.4 presents a welfare analysis of the two-tier
system. Finally, section 3 concludes.
2 The model
The model is a version of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
with two types of contracts. Firms can choose to hire new workers with a
permanent (PC) or with a …xed-term contract (temporary contract, TC).12
Contracts di¤er in length and …ring costs. To make the model as simple as
possible, assume that TCs last one period and that PCs can last an in…nite
number of periods. A worker can only be hired once on a TC by the same
…rm. Thus, after the one period TC, the …rm has to decide whether to renew
the worker into a PC or to …re him.13 A TC is going to be renewed into a
PC with an (endogenous) probability R.
The model is set in discrete time and workers decide in each period
whether or not to shirk. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz, a worker’s e¤ort is not
perfectly observable and there is a detection technology that catches shirking
workers (never erroneously) with some probability q (where q < 1). When a
worker is found shirking, he is …red and becomes unemployed. To simplify,
suppose that unemployment bene…ts are zero. In this model, all workers
are identical.14 In addition, workers are risk neutral and their instantaneous
utility function is: U(w;e) = w ¡ e; where w is the wage and e is the e¤ort.
Workers’ e¤ort choices are discrete. If they shirk, they expend zero e¤ort
and production is zero. The e¤ort required to perform in the job is e > 0.
The e¤ort is the same in any contract because there is only one type of job.
Every period, workers choose the level of e¤ort that maximizes their util-
ity actualized at rate r. Let V i
jt, i = fs;ng; j = fP;Tg be the present
12The terms …xed-term and temporary contract (TC) will be used interchangeably
throughout the paper.
13This is only a simplifying assumption. Assuming that …xed-term contracts can be
renewed into further …xed-term contracts does not change the results because, as it will
be shown, it will be necessary that at some point …xed-term contracts get renewed into
permanent ones.
14Therefore, I am not considering the possible use of TC to observe worker’s character-
istics. I implicitly assume that the “trial” period of the contract has already elapsed and
has been useful for this matter. As a consequence, there is no adverse selection problem
but only a moral hazard one. In most countries, TC include a “trial” period with no costs
of separation on either part, as in PC.
4discounted utility of an employed worker with contract j (P for permanent
contracts and T for temporary contracts) at period t when shirking (i = s)
or non shirking (i = n).
2.1 Only permanent contracts available
2.1.1 Firing costs
Assume that the legislation …xes a severance payment for permanent con-
tracts, but no severance payment for TCs.15 Modelling mandated severance
payments in a shirking e¢ciency wage model allows to distinguish cases in
which workers are …red without right of …ring indemnities (when they are
caught shirking, that is a disciplinary dismissal) from other ones in which the
…rm has to compensate …red workers (in case of redundancies or shocks).16
Since I focus on hiring decisions of …rms, the modelling of the second case
is kept simple: workers have an exogenous probability b of being separated
from their job, in that case they are protected by the legislation.
Another important aspect of employment protection legislation systems
is the workers’ right to sue employers in case of disagreement and what is
considered an “unfair” case (see OECD, 1999). Permanent workers have the
right to sue employers in every case of dismissal, but workers with a TC
cannot do it when they are not renewed.17 The e¢ciency wage model allows
to consider dismissal con‡icts explicitly. In such a context, con‡icts between
employers and employees can arise in relation to the (unobservable) e¤ort.
A double moral hazard can arise, where …rms use disciplinary cases when
facing redundancies to try to avoid paying …ring costs and workers deny
any disciplinary case to try to get compensation. This implies that court
resolutions will be imperfect, given the information problem. Consequently,
disciplinary cases are not costless, they cost dC, where C is the severance
payment and d is the probability that the court declares it “unfair”. Given
this information problem, d > 0.18
15I am considering that indemnities, when the contract expires, are zero, which is the
case in most countries. Also, as temporary contracts can be made su¢ciently short, it
can be assumed realistically that they do not involve …ring costs, because the …rm always
waits for the end of the contract whenever it wants to adjust employment.
16The terms redundancies and shocks are used interchangeably in this paper.
17As mentioned before, being TC su¢ciently short, temporary workers are actually not
renewed rather than being …red for other reasons. This implies that, in practice, temporary
workers can never sue employers in court.
18This is a simple version of Güell (2000). There, redundancies cost zC, where z ¸ d
because …rms can have greater chances to proof a truly disciplinary case than a hidden
redundancy. As shown, this cost is neutral on employment. Therefore, for simplicity, in
52.1.2 Non-shirking condition
In this section, I analyze the wage workers must be paid in order to provide
the optimal e¤ort on the job. Since PCs are assumed to have a stationary
form,19 it is possible to omit time indices. When a worker does not shirk in
a PC, he gets a utility equal to
V
n





P + b(VU + C)]; (1)
where wP is the wage of a PC and VU is the present value of utility of an
unemployed worker. If the worker decides to shirk in a PC, his utility is
V
s
P = wP +
1
1 + r
[(1 ¡ b ¡ q)V
s
P + b(VU + C) + q(VU + dC)]: (2)
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), shirking saves the current disutility
of e¤ort but it implies a higher risk of becoming unemployed. This risk
is proportional to the probability of being caught shirking (q). Firing costs
also in‡uence the e¤ort decision here because of the imperfect court decisions.
With probability d; shirking workers may be compensated with a severance
payment. This reduces the cost of shirking.
The worker will choose to provide an e¤ort e if and only if V n
p ¸ V s
p .
Using equations (1) and (2), the NSCP in form of utilities can be written as
V
n
P ¡ VU ¸
e(1 + r)
q
+ dC ´ K: (3)
This condition states that in order to provide incentives, the punishment
of losing a job must be at least equal to the opportunity cost of shirking,
denoted by K. Substituting this condition into equation (1), the incentive-
compatible wage in a PC can be written as









´ b wP: (4)
In this wage equation, it is possible to distinguish between the reservation
wage (…rst three terms) and the rent linked to the incentive problem (last
term). For C = 0, this condition is the same as in the original Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984). In order to provide incentives, wages need to exceed the
reservation wage by a rent, K: This rent is proportional to the opportunity
cost of not shirking weighted by the term (r + b). The higher the discount
this paper I assume that z = 1.
19For discussions of possible forms of bonding see Katz (1986).
6rate, the more a worker values the saving of e¤ort today. The higher the
probability of being …red for other reasons than (truly) shirking cases (i.e.
shocks), the more costly it is to expend e¤ort today.
For C > 0, it is possible to distinguish two types of e¤ects of …ring costs:
those directly related with the incentive problem and those that are not.
Firing costs a¤ect the incentive problem because to the extent that (truly)
disciplinary dismissals are declared “unfair” (i.e., d > 0), legal severance
payments reduce the punishment associated with being …red when caught
shirking. This implies that …rms have to pay higher rents in order to prevent
shirking, as can be seen in the above non-shirking condition (see equation 3).
At the same time, independently of the incentive problem, the introduc-
tion of mandated severance payments allows the employer to reduce the wage
exactly by the same proportion that the present discounted utility of an em-
ployee is increased, without a¤ecting incentives. This can be seen in the
…ring cost element of the reservation wage (see equation 4). The idea is that
lower wages today, together with compensation when being …red for shocks,
leave the present discounted utility of being employed unchanged.20
If the PC satis…es the NSCP, that is, if the worker is paid at least b wP,
or if being unemployed a is su¢ciently large punishment (V n
P > VU), the
worker will choose to expend the e¤ort e. Let VP be the expected utility of
holding a PC in equilibrium. The …rm chooses the minimum wage at which
the worker will not shirk, so that in equilibrium the NSCP is binding and
VP = V n
P = V s
P:
Many countries have legal minimum wage constraints. Implicitly, I am as-
suming here that the legislated minimum wage would be a slack constraint.
This will become more relevant in the next section where temporary con-
tracts, which will be paid at the minimum wage level, are considered.
2.1.3 Hiring decisions
In this model, all …rms are identical and in…nitely lived. They chose employ-






f(LPt) ¡ wPLPt ¡ bCLP(t¡1)
i 1
(1 + r)t;
where LP is employment in the system with only PCs and f(LP) is a CRS
production function with f0(LP) = m: In steady state,21 labor demand is
20This e¤ect of …ring costs is the same as that proposed by Lazear (1990).
21The steady state is reached after one period. For t = 0, employment is simply given
by m = wP since there are no workers to be …red.
7given by




This equation shows that, for given wages, …ring costs reduce labor de-
mand proportionally to their expected present value.
2.1.4 Market equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when each …rm, taking as given all other …rms’ wages and
employment, …nds it optimal to o¤er the going wage rather than a di¤erent
wage. The key market variable that determines …rm individual behavior is
the present value utility of an unemployed worker, VU. Let a be the rate of




[aVP + (1 ¡ a)VU]:
Given that the NSCP is satis…ed, in equilibrium
rVU = aK: (6)
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4), the e¢ciency wage curve in
equilibrium can be written as
b w
¤




(r + b + a)
(1 + r)
: (7)
In equilibrium, the incentive-compatible wage is higher the higher the exit
rate from unemployment. This result is also found in Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984). The rent linked with the incentive problem is weighted by a because
the higher a; the less becoming unemployed is a penalty.
Aggregate employment, LP, is derived from the steady state ‡ow condi-
tion. In steady state, in‡ows to unemployment are given by bLP. Out‡ows
are given by a(N ¡ LP), where N is the total of workers in the economy.
Thus






Combining equations (5) and (7), the equilibrium out‡ow rate from un-
employment, a¤, can be written as
m = e + K
(r + b + a¤)
(1 + r)
: (10)
8In equation (10), it can be seen that the second type of e¤ect of severance
payments mentioned before can be fully undone. The idea is that if markets
are complete and perfect, and …ring costs are fully transferred to workers,
then they are neutral on employment because the wage is reduced by the
same proportion as the increased shadow cost of labor (see Lazear 1990).
However, in this model, even if …ring costs are fully received by workers,
they are not neutral because they a¤ect the rent, K. The e¤ects of sever-
ance payments on the e¢ciency wage setting have no counteracting e¤ects
through the non-wage component of the shadow cost of labor. Therefore,
the wage schedule is shifted to the left and it has a negative impact e¤ect on
employment. Firing costs have a real e¤ect because they reduce the cost of
shirking.
The aggregate NSCP can also be written in terms of the unemployment




















where u = (N ¡ Lp)=N .
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), this expression shows the incompatibil-
ity of full employment with incentives.22 This expression can be represented
in the (wP; LP) space. Figure 1 shows the labor market equilibrium in the
presence of (non-neutral) …ring costs and compares it with the no …ring cost
situation.
2.2 Temporary and permanent contracts available
For a given vacancy, …rms can now choose among temporary and permanent
contracts. PCs look exactly the same as in the previous section. TCs are
analyzed in the following section.
2.2.1 Non-shirking condition in a temporary contract
Since TCs have a non stationary form and this is precisely what will drive
the results, it is convenient to use time indices to start analyzing them. The
incentive problem to examine is that of a worker holding a TC at period
t which can be renewed into a PC at period (t + 1) with probability R: If
the contract is not renewed, the worker becomes unemployed. Thus, the
22As it will be shown, this is not necessarily the case when …xed-term contracts are
introduced.
9incentive problem at (t + 1) is exactly the same as in a PC. So, the non-
shirking constraint of a TC at (t + 1); NSCT(t+1); is just the non-shirking
constraint of a PC, i.e. NSCT(t+1) = NSCP.
Providedthat the NSCT(t+1) issatis…ed, thenexpectedpresent discounted
utility of being employed with a TC at period t of not shirking and of shirking
is given respectively by
V
n














R(1 ¡ b ¡ q)VP(t+1)+
[b+ (1 ¡ R)(1 ¡ b ¡ q) + q]VU(t+1)
#
; (13)
where wT is the wage of the TC and R is the probability in which temporary
contracts get renewed into permanent ones.
Again, shirking implies saving the disutility of e¤ort today but implies
a higher risk of becoming unemployed tomorrow. Moreover, in a TC, not
being caught shirking is a necessary condition in order to be renewed into
a PC. It has been assumed that all workers are identical and that there is
a “hidden action” problem but not a “hidden information” one. Thus, in
TCs, expenditure of e¤ort does not give any additional information about
the worker’s characteristics that could in‡uence renewal. But, expenditure
of e¤ort in a TC makes renewal more likely than when shirking. Not shirking
reduces the probability to become unemployed directly.
A …rst important remark is that if there is no renewal of TC into PC
at the end of period t, then shirking is always strictly preferred (if R = 0,
then V n
Tt ¡ V s
Tt = ¡e < 0). The idea behind this is very simple: if a worker
always becomes unemployed independently of the e¤ort expended, there is
no way to give incentives to the worker by paying him a higher wage. The
only way to induce workers not to shirk in a TC is that the …rm commits to
a su¢ciently high renewal rate. In other words, that …ring is not automatic
after the end of a TC.
I am considering an extreme case where TCs last only one period and
thus the wage paid does not a¤ect incentives. But still, in a more general
case, even if the TC was longer, when unemployment is certain at the end of
the contract, wages have no incentive role. Instead, the prospects of renewal
do. When it is uncertain for a worker that he will keep the job tomorrow,
his preoccupation is more about his renewal than his wage. Once there is
no uncertainty about ending one’s contract (except for exogenous reasons),
then workers are motivated by the wage they get paid.
10The condition that guarantees incentives to expend the e¤ort in a TC at
period t; that is, the non-shirking condition of a temporary contract at t, i.e.









This condition states that incentives in a TC can be given by the renewal
rate of TC into PC and/or by the rent associated with holding a PC. Incen-
tives given with future wages is the standard idea of e¢ciency wages. The
renewal rate is also related to the incentive problem in a similar way: for
given (VP(t+1) ¡VU(t+1)), R needs to be higher, the higher the required e¤ort
(e); the more ine¢cient the control technology (q); the higher the interest
rate (r); and the higher the probability of exogenous redundancies(b).
The two mechanisms that can provide incentives in a TC are substitutes:
the higher the renewal rate, the lower the wage can be in a PC given the
incentive problem. And vice versa. However, for given permanent wages,
the renewal rate cannot be zero, as thought intuitively. Also, for given R,
workers in a PC must enjoy some rent, as in the standard e¢ciency wage
models. Figure 2 represents the NSCTt in the space (R;VP ¡ VU).
An incentive-compatible TC must satisfy the NSCTt and the NSCP. As
seen in the previous section, workers in PCs are paid the minimum rent
compatible with incentives, that is, the NSCP is binding. This reduces the
possible values of R to
R ¸
e(1 + r)
e(1 + r) + qdC
= R
¤: (15)
Figure 3 represents the two non-shirking constraints of a TC. The thicker
line in the graph represents the combinations of (R;VP ¡ VU) where the two
NSC are satis…ed. And R¤ is the renewal rate for which both NSC are
binding. Note that for the case where d > 0, R¤ < 1. That is, if …ring
costs are non-neutral on permanent employment, the minimum incentive-
compatible renewal rate is less than one.
To conclude this section, it has been found that incentives in a TC are
provided with a combination of a non-zero renewal rate into a PC and a
non-zero rent paid in a PC. The rent is the minimal rent compatible with
incentives given by the NSCP, and the renewal rate R can take any value
within the NSCTt compatible with such rent, that is R ¸ R¤. Let this
condition be NSCT: Let VT be the expected utility in equilibrium of a TC.
Since VT satis…es the NSCT; then VT = V n
T : In the next section the …rm’s
objective function is introduced and its choice of contracts as well as the
determination of R is analyzed.
112.2.2 Choice of contracts in a two-tier system
I …rst analyze the choice of contracts for a given vacancy and then calculate
in the next section the …rm’s labor demand for the given (optimal) contract
chosen.
When the …rm hires a new worker, it can choose between a PC (as the
one described in section 2.1) or a TC (as the one described in the previous
section). The …rm compares the present discounted value of marginal pro…ts
with the two di¤erent types of contracts taking into account their respective
incentive constraints. Let ¦it be the present discounted value of marginal
pro…ts with type i contract (i = T;P). That is
¦it = f











(1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ R)¦T(t+1) + (1 ¡ b)R¦P(t+1) for i = T
¡bC + (1 ¡ b)¦P(t+1) for i = P
Firms always get the net product instantaneously with any type of con-
tract. Then, with a PC, the …rm incurs the …ring cost if there is a redun-
dancy, otherwise the contract continues. TCs end after one period. If there
is a shock, the contract does not continue and this is not costly for the …rm.
Otherwise, the contract continues, becoming a permanent one (with proba-
bility R) or restarting with a new worker with another TC (with probability
1 ¡ R).
Lemma 1. The optimal contract in a two-tier system is a …xed-term
contract that is renewed into a permanent contract with probability R.
Proof: It is easy to note that the permanent contract problem (i = P) is
just the subproblem at (t+1) of the temporary contract problem (i = T) at
t. Since the wage in a TC, wT, has no incentive role (implying that it will
not be higher than the e¢ciency wage in a PC) and there are no …ring costs,
the …rm cannot be made worse o¤ by starting with a …xed-term contract.23
Therefore, the optimal strategy for the …rm is to start with a TC and
after one period renew it into a PC with some probability R. The renewal
rate is chosen to maximize the present discounted value of marginal pro…ts of
a TC (¦T) subject to the NSCT. The …rm also chooses the wage to be paid
during the TC. For reasons that will become apparent, I consider two cases:
23If the wage in a TC is higher than in a PC then the two-tier system would not be an
equilibrium (see Proposition 2).
12(1) where wT is ‡exible and the …rm only has to consider a participation
constraint and (2) where there is some legislation that sets the wage at least
at a minimum level, say wmin. In this case, the participation constraint is
slack.24
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case (1): VT ¸ VU
case (2): wT ¸ wmin
The resolution of this problem leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If wages in …xed-term contracts are perfectly ‡exible, then
the …rm is indi¤erent among any incentive-compatible renewal rate of …xed-
term contracts into permanent contracts, that is R 2 (R¤;1): But if there
are minimum wage restrictions, then the …rm chooses the minimum renewal
rate, that is, R¤:
Proof: see appendix.
The idea behind this result is simple. If wages in TCs are perfectly
‡exible, all the e¤ects of …ring costs on the wage setting of the PC can be
undone with the wage of the …rst period while the worker is in a TC. Thus the
…rm is indi¤erent among any renewal rate because pro…ts can always be kept
constant. In this case, the economy would be at full employment.25 Instead,
if wages are not perfectly ‡exible, the optimal rate of renewal is the minimum
compatible with incentives, that is R¤, where R¤ < 1: The mechanism that is
preventing higher renewal rates is the non-neutral e¤ect of …ring costs on the
e¢ciency wage. Figure 4 represents the iso-pro…ts curves for the two cases
in the space (R, VP ¡ VU):
Back to the initial question, note that this result provides an interesting
and paradoxical explanation of the use of TCs: when temporary contracts
are very “cheap”, the …rm is actually indi¤erent among TCs or PCs. While
when temporary contracts are more “expensive”, the …rm actually chooses
the minimum share of PC given the incentive constraints.
24As mentioned, the legislated minimum wage would be a slack constraint in the world
with only permanent contracts. A further discussion on this is done in section (2.3) when
the two systems are compared.
25To see how full employment can be reached in an e¢ciency wage model see Remark 1
in section 2.2.4 where employment in a two-tier system is derived.
132.2.3 Hiring decisions
In this section I derive the labor demand for the optimal type of contract
described in Proposition 1 (case 2).26 Firms maximize employment given the
wage of TC (wmin) and renewal rate (R¤) of this contract. Such a contract
implies that the total workforce will be the sum of those workers with a TC
(those who are in the …rst period of their contract) and those with a PC.
Workers with a PC are either those who have just been renewed from a TC
or those who already had a PC and were not …red. To distinguish from the
system in which only PCs were available, I denote with “ e” the value of
variables that were also present in that system (i.e. LP;wp;a;VU ). Thus
e LPt = (1 ¡ b)e LP(t¡1) + R
¤(1 ¡ b)LT(t¡1) 8t;t = 1;:::;+1 (16)
and
e LP0 = 0:










The steady state labor demand is given by









r + b + R¤(1 ¡ b)
:
In a two-tier system, the marginal product of labor is equalized to a
weighted sum of the marginal cost of a TC and the marginal cost of a PC.
The weights correspond to the actualized share of TC, (¯); and PC, (1¡¯);
respectively. A more detailed discussion on ¯ is done in the next section.
2.2.4 Market equilibrium
As before, the key market variable is e VU. In a two-tier system, all contracts
start with a TC. Therefore,
e VU =
e a
r + e a
VT: (18)
26As mentioned, there is full employment in case 1.






1 + r + e a
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where the term e(1+r)=q denotes the importance of the shirking problem in
a TC, that is, R¤(VP ¡ VU); given by (14).
Now, going back to equation (4), the e¢ciency wage of a PC in a two-tier
system is given by
e w
¤








(1 + r + e a)
"





As before, e L is derived from the steady state ‡ows conditions27. Let e L
be total employment in the two-tier system, which equals temporary em-
ployment, LT plus permanent employment, e LP: In‡ows and out‡ows into
employment have basically the same structure as in the system only with
PCs. There are also the ‡ows from the renewal and non-renewals of TC.
Figure 5 represents all these ‡ows.
In the steady state, the out‡ow from unemployment isgiven by e a(N ¡
e L) workers. The in‡ow to unemployment comes from those whose TC is
not renewed, (1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ R¤)LT, and from all those who lost their jobs for
exogenous reasons, be L. Thus
e a(N ¡ LT ¡ e LP) = (1 ¡ R
¤)(1 ¡ b)LT + b(LT + e LP): (21)
At any time, a proportion R¤ of those TCs that are not …nished for ex-
ogenous reasons, are renewed into PCs, while a proportion b of those already
in PCs become unemployed. So
(1 ¡ b)R
¤LT = be LP: (22)
Combining these last two conditions, temporary and permanent employment
can be written as
LT =
e aNb
b + e a[b + (1 ¡ b)R¤]
; e LP =
aN(1 ¡ b)R¤
b + e a[b+ (1 ¡ b)R¤]
:
The proportion of TCs is given by
® =
b
b+ (1 ¡ b)R¤ (23)
27The optimal contract described above implies that the steady state equilibrium can
be reached in two periods.
15and (1 ¡ ®) is the proportion of permanent contracts.
Combining (17) and (20), the equilibrium out‡ow rate of unemployment
in a two-tier system, e a¤, can be written as







(1 + r + e a¤)
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Going back to the e¢ciency wage in the two-tier system, it is possible to
express (20) in terms of the unemployment rate. This allows to do the follow-
ing remark. Replacing (22) into (21), the out‡ow rate from unemployment
can be written as
e a =
®(1 ¡ e u)
e u
;
where e u = (N¡LT¡ e LP)=N is the unemployment rate in the two-tier system.
So, the e¢ciency wage curve in equilibrium is given by
e w
¤







®(1 ¡ e u)
®(1 ¡ e u) + e u(1 + r)
Ã






Remark 1 Full employment is not incompatible with the incentive problem
in a two-tier system as it is in the system with only one type of contract
(as in Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). But it would always be a “mixed” full
employment, i.e. full employment in which TC and PC coexist.
This can be seen directly from expression (25): the incentive-compatible
wage for zero unemployment rate is …nite.28 This is in sharp contrast from
the situation with only PCs (see equation 11). However, this full employment
would be ‘mixed’, in other words, with both types of contracts coexisting. In
this case, full employment is compatible with incentives. The reason is that
each type of employment gives incentives to the other: temporary workers are
motivated by the possibility of getting a better contract, that is, a permanent
contract. And permanent workers are motivated to work in order to avoid
restarting with a …xed-term contract.29
28From Proposition 1, we have that in case 1, for any combination of (wT;R), a ¡! 1:
29Although temporary wages are lower than those in a PC, temporary workers get
incentives from the renewal prospects into higher utility contracts. Firing costs make TC
162.3 Comparing two systems: two-tier vs. only perma-
nent contracts
In this section I compare employment levels and the e¤ects of …ring costs in
each system. I start with the equilibrium conditions for each system.
For a system to be an equilibrium, it has to be the case that …rms cannot
make higher pro…ts by o¤ering the other type of contract within that system.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium conditions for each system depend on the
level of the minimum wage.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 2 For wmin > m, the system with only permanent contracts is
the only equilibrium. For wmin < m, the two-tier system is the only equilib-
rium. For wmin = m, any of the two systems can be an equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix
The idea behind this result is that given that in the system with only
PCs workers are paid their marginal product, when the minimum wage is
above m, TCs are more costly than PCs so …rms would o¤er PCs only. On
the contrary, when the minimum wage is below m, TCs are “cheap” and
…rms end up in a two-tier system. For the case where the minimum wage
is exactly m, any contract has the same cost and both systems generate the
same pro…ts so either of the two systems could be an equilibrium.
2.3.1 Employment levels
It is important to know if the introduction of TC generates higher employ-
ment or not despite the fact that, in general, it creates a higher segmentation
of the labor market. Comparing (24) with (10), it is possible to distinguish
two e¤ects at play. On the one hand, for given wages, employment is higher
in a two-tier system due to a composition e¤ect. The weight ¯ corresponds
to an actualized share of TC given by ® (equation 23).30 On the other hand,
worse not only because …red workers are not paid an indemnity, but also because they
make R¤ < 1. If there were no …ring costs, then R¤ = 1 and the only potential di¤erence
between contracts would be their wage. In this case, an upward sloping wage pro…le would
not generally be a perfect substitute for a …rst-best contract with an upfront fee, as argued
by Akerlof and Katz (1989).






. Also, if r = +1;then f0(e L) =
wmin. That is, if …rms are patient, they equalize the marginal product of labor to the
average cost of labor. In the opposite extreme case, …rms only perceive the cost of the
present labor force which is always holding a TC.
17e w¤
P is not necessarily equal to b w¤
P: This also has an e¤ect on employment. If
wages of PC are higher in a two-tier system than in a system with only PCs,
ceteris paribus, employment would be lower in a two-tier system.
Lemma 3. The di¤erence in employment levels in the two systems de-
pends on the level of the minimum wage.
Proof: see appendix
Intuitively, the composition e¤ect is lower the higher the minimum wage
is. From Proposition 1, the share of TC in the economy is constant for
any (positive) wmin and, therefore, increases of the minimum wage are not
compensated by a reduction of TCs. At the same time, the di¤erence in
permanent contract wages in the two systems also depends on the level of
minimum wages. The higher the minimum wage, the higher the permanent
wage in the two-tier system.31 This, in turn, also reduces employment in the
two-tier system.
So, the e¤ect of TC on employment depends crucially on the level of min-
imum wages. Therefore, a two-tier system does not guarantee higher levels
of employment. More precisely, the following proposition can be formulated:
Proposition 3 There exists a value w¤
min such that: for wmin > w¤
min, em-
ployment is higher in the system with only permanent contracts. Moreover,
there is a range of values of wmin, namely wmin 2 [w¤
min;m], for which the
minimum wage constraint corresponding to wmin is slack in the system with
only PC.
Proof: see appendix.
The idea is that for high enough minimum wages, the fact that a two-tier
system has less permanent workers is not compensated by their higher labor
cost. The interest of the result is that there is a range of values for which
the wmin is high enough to make employment in the two-tier system lower,
but it is not so high to as to make directly labor costs higher in the two-tier
system. Indeed, it is possible to have higher employment in the system with
only PCs even though PCs are still paid above the minimum wage constraint.
That is, the composition e¤ect is not eliminated.
Now, the question is: Is it always the case that a system is an equilibrium
when employment is higher in that system? The study of this question gives
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When the system with only PC is an equilibrium, employ-
ment is always higher in such a system. But in the range of minimum wages,
31This comes from the fact that in the two-tier system all contracts start being TC
which are paid at the minimum wage.
18wmin 2 (w¤
min;m); employment is higher in a system with only PC even though
a two-tier system is the resulting equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix.
When …rms chose PCs it is because TCs are too expensive. By the same
token, the two-tier system would generate lower employment and the system
with only PCs (which generates higher employment) is the only equilibrium.
The mechanism behind is that when the minimum wage is low enough, …rms
do not take into account that by using TCs (and not PCs directly) they hire
more, increasing e a, and therefore increasing e wp so much that total employ-
ment turns out to be lower than it would have been with only PCs .
2.3.2 E¤ects of …ring costs in a two-tier system
In the system with only PCs , the e¤ect of …ring costs was clear-cut: their
non-neutral e¤ect on the wage setting reduced employment. Given the results
on employment in a two-tier system found in the last section, it is interesting
to analyze the e¤ects of …ring costs in the two-tier system. That is, are …ring
costs neutral in a two-tiersystem despite the fact that the sign of employment
is ambiguous?
In the two-tier system, …ring costs also reduce employment, but it is im-
portant to distinguish two e¤ects. First, they reduce employment just like
in the system with only PCs because of their positive e¤ect on permanent
contract wages. Note that this e¤ect is lower than in the other system since
the proportion of permanent employment is in general lower. Second, …r-
ing costs also play a role in the determination of the renewal rate. The
higher the rent in a PC (due to the e¤ect of …ring costs), the lower incentive-
compatible renewal rate, R¤, needs to be.32 This reduces the above e¤ect.
That is, employment is less reduced. The question then is: does it eliminate
it completely?
Proposition 5 The neutrality of …ring costs cannot be restored with the in-
troduction of …xed-term contracts for any imperfectly ‡exible temporary wage.
Proof: see appendix.
The intuition is that the incentive problem imposes a minimum propor-
tion of permanent employment and that its costs can only be compensated
at the expense of lower wages for temporary workers. But, as it is shown,
there is no positive temporary wage that can undo the e¤ect of …ring costs.
32This e¤ect could make insiders holding a PC push for higher …ring costs and …rms
accept it since it would allow them to o¤er lower renewal rates to new entrants with TC.
19This means that the introduction of TC may imply higher employment
despite the fact that it does not remove the ine¢ciency of …ring costs com-
pletely. What happens then when the non-neutrality e¤ect of …ring costs
is reduced? That is, what happens if d is reduced? In the system with
only PCs, employment increases. In the two-tier system, employment also
increases as well as the renewal rate of TCs. So, the labor market is less seg-
mented. This explains why the introduction of TCs keeping PCs unchanged
(that is, leaving the non–neutral e¤ects of …ring costs unchanged) leads to
a substitution of TCs for PCs without a necessary increase of total employ-
ment. Therefore, the removal of the non-neutrality e¤ects of …ring costs is
an e¢cient policy. Whether it would have more impact e¤ect in one system
or the other depends again in the level of minimum wages that determine
the di¤erence in employment in both systems.
2.4 Welfare Analysis
Finally, it is important to know if the equilibrium allocation is constrained
Pareto e¢cient or not. The social planner maximizes aggregate welfare
W = LP(VP + ¦P) + LT(VT + ¦T) + (N ¡ L)VU:
In steady state, the in‡ows and out‡ows from each group are such that
maximizing aggregate welfare across agents is equivalent as maximizing the
expected utility of a representative individual that gets all the resources in
the economy, that is
LP(wP ¡ e) + LT(wT ¡ e) + LP(m ¡ wP) + LT(m ¡ wT);
which in turn equals
LP(m ¡ e) + LT(m ¡ e) = L(m ¡ e):
that is, total output minus the social cost of production (the e¤ort, e).
Thus, thecentral planner isonly concernedwithtotal employment. There-
fore, from Proposition 4, the market outcome is not always e¢cient. More
precisely, the two-tier system is not always socially optimal. So, what is the
socially optimal renewal rate of TCs?
The social planner maximizes employment in a two-tier system subject to
the NSCs and the minimum wage constraint. Moreover, the social allocation
must be pro…table from the private point of view, that is aggregate pro…ts
must be non-negative. So, the social planner solves
20Max
R;a;wT ;wp
(m ¡ e)e L(a;R)
s:t:
8
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R ¸ R¤ (¸1)
R · 1 (¸2)








1 + r + a
"











e LP(a;R) ¸ 0 (¸4)
wT ¸ wmin (¸5)
The resolution of this problem leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 6 There exists a value w¤¤
min such that: for wmin > w¤¤
min, the





Thus from the social point of view, there are gains from reducing the
segmentation of the labor market because this increases total employment.
In particular, the two-tier system does not generate higher employment com-
pared to the system with only PCs, the socially optimal renewal rate is larger
than the private one. The intuition is the following. Firms do not take into
account that when they increase the rate of renewal, permanent wages will
fall. Thus, they chose the minimum incentive-compatible renewal rate be-
cause they take as given permanent wages.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the introduction of …xed-term contracts in
an economy where …ring costs reduce employment. The model has shown
that the choice of …xed-term contracts is understandable even in a context of
e¢ciency wages. The idea is that the renewal rate into permanent contracts
has an incentive role. In addition, renewal rates are lower the higher the
(negative) e¤ect of …ring costs on employment.
It is often stated that the argument for introducing …xed-term contracts
is that this is “the price to pay to get full employment”. But higher employ-
ment at the expense of segmentation of the labor market only arises if wages
are very ‡exible. Otherwise, employment is not necessarily higher than in a
system with only permanent contracts while the labor market becomes seg-
mented. The idea is that perfect wage ‡exibility would be required in order
for …xed-term contracts to eliminate the non-neutrality e¤ect of …ring costs.
21This can explain why the introduction of …xed-term contracts keeping
permanent contracts unchanged (that is, leaving the non–neutral e¤ects of
…ring costs unchanged) leads to a substitution of …xed-term for permanent
contracts without a necessary increase of total employment as it is seen in
some European countries.
Moreover, from the social point of view, market segmentation is too large.
Higher renewal rates of …xed-term contracts into permanent contracts lead
to higher employment levels. This analysis suggests that, policies on the
employment protection legislation tackling the core labor contracts can be
more e¢cient in motivating the creation of employment and, more precisely,
the creation of permanent employment.
224 Appendix
4.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. I …rst analyze case 1 and then case 2.
² In case 1, the …rm chooses to pay the lowest wage that satis…es the
participation constraint, that is wT such that VT = VU: Using equation (12),
in equilibrium, this wage is given by
wT = e ¡
(1 ¡ b)
1 + r






















= sign((¦P ¡ ¦T) + (VP ¡ VU)):
The …rst element (¦P ¡ ¦T) shows the direct e¤ect of the renewal rate
on temporary pro…ts: every contract renewed gives ¦P instead of ¦T. The
second element shows the indirect e¤ect of the renewal rate through the
wage setting in TCs: an increase in the renewal rate implies an increase of
the utility of holding a TC proportional to the rent in permanent contracts,
(VP ¡VU); which allows to reach the participation constraint with a reduction
of the wage in TCs (and therefore increase pro…ts) by the same amount.
It is possible to rewrite the above expression in terms of total surplus, Si,
of a match with the current worker on a PC or on a TC, that is, Si = ¦i+Vi
for i = fP;Tg:
sign((¦P ¡ ¦T) + (VP ¡ VU)) = sign(SP ¡ ST + VT ¡ VU); where
SP = m ¡ e +
1
1 + r
[bVU + (1 ¡ b)SP] and
ST = m ¡ e +
1
1 + r
[bVU + (1 ¡ b)RSP + (1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ R)(VU + ¦T)]:
The di¤erence in surplus among the di¤erent contracts depends crucially
on the renewal rate and on the fact that TC can only be used once on the
same worker. If the renewal rate is 1, then TCs and PCs generate the same
total surplus. Their di¤erence is just in the distribution of this surplus among
current worker and employer. Secondly, the fact that TCs can only be used
once on the same worker implies a change of utility (from holding a TC to
becoming unemployed) for current workers holding a TC whenever they are
not renewed. Therefore
sign(SP ¡ ST) = sign[(1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ R)(VT ¡ VU)] and
23sign((¦P ¡ ¦T) + (VP ¡ VU)) = sign[(1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ R)(VT ¡ VU)]:







Therefore, the …rm is indi¤erent among any incentive-compatible R.
Note that fromthe wholeeconomy point of view the twotypesof contracts
also generate the same surplus because when a TC is not renewed, the …rm
starts a new one with another worker. The intuition for this is simple: there
is only one type of job in the economy and workers are all homogeneous.
Globally, the di¤erent contracts just determine a di¤erent distribution of
surplus among workers and employers.
² In case 2, the wage for TCs is …xed exogenously and there is only a






= sign(¦P ¡ ¦T):
sign(¦P ¡ ¦T) = sign(wT ¡ wP ¡
bC
1 + r
) < 0; since wT · wP:
So, the …rm chooses the minimal renewal rate incentive-compatible.
4.2 Proof of lemma 2
Proof. : ² A system with only PCs is an equilibrium i¤:
¦P( b wP) ¸ ¦T(wmin;R
¤;¦P( b wP)): (26)
² A two-tier system is an equilibrium i¤:
¦T(wmin;R
¤;¦P( e wP)) ¸ ¦P( e wP): (27)
Condition (26) is satis…ed i¤ wmin ¸ b w¤
p () wmin ¸ m:
Condition (27) is satis…ed i¤ wmin · e w¤





4.3 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. : From lemma 2: for every value of wmin the equilibrium is de…ned
as follows:
² if wmin < m; the two-tier system is an equilibrium.
² if wmin = m; any of the two systems can be an equilibrium.
² if wmin > m; the system with only PCs is an equilibrium.
244.4 Proof of lemma 3




and e L =
e aN [b+ (1 ¡ b)R¤]
b+ e a[b + (1 ¡ b)R¤]
:
From equation (10), a¤ =











J ¡ ¯ b J
[(wmin ¡ e)(1 + r) + (1 ¡ b)R¤K](1 ¡ ¯)
and b J ´ J¡(m¡wmin)(1+
r):
The di¤erence in employment in the two systems is given by:
sign(LP ¡ e L) = sign(a¤ ¡ e a¤ [b + (1 ¡ b)R¤]); where e a¤ = e a¤(wmin):
If wmin = w¤
min =)
h






KMJr + r¯JK(1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ R¤) + KMm(1 + r)2¯ + J (J + e(1 + r) + Kb)
(1 + r)[J + ¯MK(1 + r)]
;
where M = b + (1 ¡ b)R¤:
So,
² if wmin > w¤
min; LP > e L:
² if wmin < w¤
min; LP < e L.
4.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. :
² From Lemma 3, if wmin > w¤
min =) LP > e L:
² To check if the minimum wage constraint is binding in the system with
only permanent contracts, b w¤
P ¡ w¤
min needs to be calculated.
sign( b w¤
P ¡ w¤




m(1 + r)J ¡ m(1 + r)2KM¯ ¡ KMJ(1 ¡ ¯)r
¡KMm(1 + r)2 ¡ JKr¯ ¡ J(J + e(1 + r) + Kb)
#
=
sign[J (J + Kr ¡ J) ¡ JKr(M(1 ¡ ¯) + ¯)] =
sign[JKr(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ M)] =
sign[JKr(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ R¤)] > 0:
Since b w¤
P ¡ w¤
min > 0; then for wmin 2 (w¤
min;m), LP > e L and wmin not
binding in the system with only PCs.
254.6 Proof of Proposition 4
² From proposition 2, the system with PCs only is an equilibrium if
wmin > m: From lemma 3, employment in is this system is higher if wmin >
w¤
min: From proposition 3, m > w¤
min. This implies that whenever the system
with PCs only is an equilibrium, employment is always higher in that system.
² From proposition 2, the two-tier system is an equilibrium if wmin < m:
From lemma 3, if wmin 2 (w¤
min;m) employment is lower in this system.
Therefore it is this same range of wmin for which the two-tier system is an
equilibrium despite the fact that employment in the two-tier system is lower
and the minimum wage constraint is not binding in the system with only
PCs.
4.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. : The e¤ects of F (the non-neutral …ring cost, F = dC) on employ-
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) = sign[¡(m ¡ wmin)(wmin ¡ e + (1 ¡ b)e=q)]:
Forall the caseswhere the two-tiersystemis anequilibrium, m¡wmin > 0:
From Proposition 1 it is possible to write: wmin = e ¡ (1 ¡ b)e=q + A; where
A > 0 in case 2 (and A · 0 in case 1). Therefore,
@e a
@F




< 0; in case 2. That is, for all wmin in case 2, …ring costs reduce
employment.
4.8 Proof of Proposition 6
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(3) wP : ¸3 ¡ ¸4LP = 0
(4) wT : ¸5 ¡ ¸3
a
1 + r + a
¡ ¸4LT = 0
² Conditions (3) and (4) imply that either ¸3 = ¸4 = ¸5 = 0 or ¸3 > 0;
¸4 > 0; and ¸5 > 0: The …rst case implies a contradiction (from (2), R would
be negative). Therefore these multipliers are positive implying that the three
constraints associated are binding.
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J ¡ ® b J
J ¡ b J + K(r + M)(1 ¡ ®)
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¸ 0, where this




JKr(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ M) + JK
Ã
Mrb(1 ¡ ®) +
r2R¤(1 ¡ b)
r + M
(1 ¡ R¤(1 ¡ b))
!
(1 + r)(1 ¡ M)[J + Kb(1 + ®r)]
;
where
M = b + (1 ¡ b)R¤:
So, when wmin 2 [w¤¤
min;m], the socially e¢cient renewal rate of …xed-term
contracts is 1:
² From Proposition 3:
m ¡ w¤
min =
JKr(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ M)






So, when the market solution is not optimal, the socially e¢cient renewal
rate of …xed-term contracts is 1:
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Figure 3: Non-shirking conditions of a temporary contract
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Figure 4: Optimal renewal rate with ‡exible and non ‡exible wages
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Figure 5: Flows of the labor market in a two-tier system
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